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ABSTRACT
The Coase theorem implies that, in a world of positive transaction costs, any of a number
of strategies, including judicially enforced private contracts, judicially enforced laws, or even
government regulation, may be the cheapest way to bring about efficient resource allocation.
Unfortunately, some Coasians have ignored the possibility that the last of these strategies may
sometimes be the best. This paper compares the regulation of financial markets in Poland and the
Czech Republic in the 1990s, when the judicial systems remained underdeveloped in both
countries. In Poland, strict enforcement of the securities law by an independent Securities and
Exchange Commission was associated with rapid development of the stock market. In the Czech
Republic, hands-off regulation was associated with a near collapse of the stock market. These
episodes illustrate the centrality of law enforcement in making markets work, and the possible role
of regulators in law enforcement.                                                  
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